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Abstract
We conduct a repeated VCM (voluntary contribution mechanism) experiment using the
strategy method. We compare a partner and a stranger design and find that participants
in the partner treatment provide (i) higher initial contributions, (ii) higher contributions
on average over all periods, and (iii) contributions that do not vary more strongly with
past contributions than participants in the stranger treatment. We conclude from our
evidence that strategic motives can account for a large share of the treatment differences
typically observed in this literature.
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1 Introduction
We conducted a repeated VCM experiment with a random ending rule in a strategy method
(Selten, 1967). Subjects were asked to provide a full description of their behavior in unit-
recall strategies. That is, subjects had to provide (1) their initial contribution and (2) their
dynamic response contribution conditioned on any possible average contribution by others in
the previous period. Our only treatment variable is the matching protocol. In one session
the subjects were exposed to a partner matching (group composition remained the same
throughout the experiment); in the other to a stranger matching (group composition randomly
changed from period to period).
VCM mechanisms and the relation to the matching protocol have been studied extensively
in the literature. Most experiments though do not use the strategy method. An early study is
Andreoni (1988). He examines the role of learning and strategic behavior as explanations for
the decay in contributions that is typically observed in (finitely) repeated VCM experiments.
He adopts a stranger condition and a partner condition and implemented a surprise restart
in both conditions. The learning hypothesis states that behavior in the final period should
not be different in both conditions. The strategic behavior hypothesis implies that partners
should contribute more than strangers. Strikingly strangers are found to contribute more
than partners over all periods (including the final one). Therefore, both the learning and the
strategic behavior hypotheses had to be rejected.
It has been proven difficult to replicate the result that strangers contribute more than
partners.1 Moreover, after the surprise restart the contributions by partners increased struc-
turally whereas for strangers the contributions went back to the original level rather quickly.
Apparently subjects do recognize the impact of their contributions on future contributions
by their partners, and hence behave strategically. According to Sonnemans et al. (1999) “the
role of strategic behavior in public good games is [still] unresolved”.
Sonnemans et al. (1999) used an interesting design to investigate strategic behavior. Group
compositions gradually changed by switching two subjects after a certain amount of periods
(minimum of three and maximum of twelve). Prior to any decision making, all subjects
were informed when a switch would take place in their group and whether they were switched
themselves or one of the group members. In either case, partners who were drifted apart would
never meet again. The authors find that contributions decline when a change is approaching,
and that subjects that are about to leave a group temporarily decrease their contribution. This
finding provides evidence for the important role of strategic (forward looking) behavior. They
also elicit beliefs on the expected contribution by others and find that subjects with higher
1Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) also find that strangers contribute more. Croson (1996), Sonnemans et al.
(1999) and Keser and van Winden (2000), among others, find that partners contribute more. Weimann (1994)
finds no significant difference. Andreoni and Croson (2008) provide a discussion of the literature comparing
contributions by partners and strangers. In a indefinitely repeated two-player prisoner’s dilemma, Duffy and
Ochs (2009) found that partners contribute more.
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expectations contribute more, and conclude that this is evidence for adaptive (backward
looking) behavior as beliefs are highly correlated with past observations.
Keser and van Winden (2000) focus on conditional cooperation and distinguish between
future-oriented (strategic) behavior and simple reactive behavior. Future-oriented behavior
includes aspects of subjects’ behavior that are induced by their perception of future inter-
action and explains higher initial contributions and endgame effects in the partner setting.
Simple reactive behavior assumes behavior to be oriented towards the observed average contri-
bution of the other group members in the previous period and includes motives of reciprocity
and inequity aversion. Both these latter motives are identified by adaptations of individual
contributions towards the group average. They find evidence of both types of conditional
cooperation playing a role. Moreover, they argue that the higher contribution in the partner
treatment is largely due to the higher initial contribution.
In a repeated sequential prisoner’s dilemma setting, Reuben and Suetens (2009) differ-
entiate between endgame behavior and continuation behavior. They find that the endgame
effect is mainly caused by strategically cooperating individuals and conclude that the main
motive for cooperation is strategic.
The advantage of using the strategy method for the repeated game is that we can disen-
tangle initial contributions from dynamic responses and hence control for path dependencies.
Our design also enables us to gain insight into the question of whether it is mainly strategic
consideration or mainly reciprocity that drives behavior or others. This is an utterly im-
portant question since it enables us to understand to which extent people understand the
strategic implications of repeated interactions and react to them in a way predicted by the-
ory. Both reciprocity and the strategic hypothesis predict higher contributions on the induced
path in the partner than in the stranger setting. If reciprocity is the driving force then such
treatment differences should be mainly reflected in a steeper slope of the dynamic response in
the partner treatment, since only in the partner treatment participants have the possibility to
directly “reward” high and “punish” low contributions by their partners. Under the strategic
hypothesis, on the other hand, treatment differences should be mainly reflected in a higher
initial contribution and higher dynamic contributions on average, but not necessarily in a
steeper slope.
As in Fischbacher et al. (2001) our design does not allow for learning and hence we check
for regret in a post-experimental questionnaire. An advantage of our design with respect to
Sonnemans et al. (1999) is that strategic behavior is not triggered by awareness of alternative
matching procedures, since we use a between-subjects design.
We find that the initial contributions as well as the mean dynamic response contributions
in the partner treatment first-order stochastically dominate those in the stranger treatment.
There is no significant treatment difference between the slopes of the dynamic responses. The
difference in initial and mean dynamic response contribution cause a substantial different
trend in the induced path of contributions which tends to be much higher in the partner
3
treatment. Qualitatively the induced paths resemble the trend of contributions found in
experiments conducted without the strategy method.2 This leads us to conclude that it is
mainly strategic motives that drive contributions and that people seem to account well for
the repeated nature of the interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the experimental design.
Section 3 collects our main results and Section 4 provides a discussion. The instructions for
the experiment and some additional graphs and tables can be found in the appendices.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiment, participants played a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) game.
Each of four group members is endowed with 10 tokens and decides how many of these to
contribute into a joint project. Every token that is not contributed to the project generates
a private income of 2 ECU. In addition, each group member benefits from the joint project.
Every token that is contributed to the joint project experiences a return of 4 ECU that is
equally divided among the group members (that is: 1 ECU each). Hence, the project has a
marginal per capita return of 0.5.
Participants played the VCM repeatedly. We employed a random ending rule. In each
period there was a 90% chance that the experiment would continue with another period. In
the first period participants were randomly and anonymously assigned into groups of size 4.
In the Partner treatment the group composition remained fixed; in the Stranger treatment
groups were randomly determined each period anew. Participants were fully informed about
all treatment details. For each treatment, we ran one session with 24 participants.
Instead of making a choice in each period, participants were asked to specify their initial
contribution and dynamic response behavior. For the dynamic response, participants had
to specify their contribution conditional on the average contribution by the (former) group
members in the previous period. Next the repeated VCM was simulated by the following
iterative process. The initial contributions determined the contributions for the first period.
For all remaining periods, the dynamic response behavior was applied. After making their
decision participants observed the outcome of these simulations for each period until the end
of the experiment. This mechanism (as well as all other details) were carefully explained to
all participants in the instructions.3
Note that the design does not allow participants to condition their contribution behavior
on the full history of realized contributions and time. This is one of the reasons we decided for
a random ending rule rather than a fixed ending, since with the fixed ending rule one should
2Our induced paths are very similar to those found in other public goods experiments with the same
incentives. Therefore, we believe that the strategy method did not substantially distort decisions. Also
Brandts and Charness (2000) did not find a difference in behavior between a ‘hot’ and a ‘cold’ (strategy
method) setting for experiments with the prisoner’s dilemma and the game of chicken played sequentially.
3Instructions are provided in Appendix D.
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not expect strategies to be time independent. Still, not allowing participants to condition their
contributions on more than just the last observation is restrictive.4 There are several reasons
why we opted for this restriction to unit-recall strategies. It is the simplest kind of behavior
that captures dynamics and hence does not require too much sophistication from participants.
Moreover, it allows for a clean, unobstructed analysis of the influence of observed contributions
in the past on future contributions and it substantially reduces the dimensionality to classify
individuals. Finally, in Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (forthcoming) yesterday’s realizations are
found to be a highly significant ingredient for today’s beliefs.
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the faculty of economics
and business administration at Maastricht University in March 2009. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before the start
of a session, subjects read the instructions and were allowed to ask questions that were then
individually answered. Afterwards subjects had to answer control questions which tested
their understanding of the instructions. One of the experimenters checked the answers and
the experiment only started after all subjects answered each question correctly. Subjects
earned ECU during the experiment that were converted into Euro at a known exchange
rate (one ECU equals three Eurocents) at the end of the experiment. In addition, subjects
received a show-up fee of 3 Euro and 2 Euro compensation for answering a post-experimental
questionnaire. On average, a session lasted slightly less than 90 minutes. The average payoff
was 16.32 Euro.
3 Results
Before we start the description of our main results let us set some notation. We denote by cit
the contribution (to the public good) of individual i in (simulated) period t. Hence ci
0
denotes
i’s initial allocation. With ϕi(c¯) we denote i’s allocation conditional on average allocation c¯.
Remember that we elicit only ci
0
and ϕi(c¯) explicitly and then simulate the induced paths of
actual contributions. This has the advantage of producing many independent observations.
In fact, we have 24 independent observation in each treatment.
In addition, we would like to point out some evidence from the post-experimental question-
naire. Since we exclude possibilities for learning (by design), we checked whether participants
felt any regret after the experiment. After the participants made their choices and observed
the induced path of play for 12 (14) periods in the Partner (Stranger) treatment we asked
them the following question:
“If you were given the possibility to repeat this experiment. Would you make differ-
ent decisions in either the initial allocation (first decision screen) or the conditional
allocation (second decision screen)? And if so, what would you do different and why?”
4A less restrictive approach has been taken by Keser (2000).
5
Only 29% of the participants in the Stranger treatment and 37% of those in the Partner treat-
ment expressed some regret.5 The respective treatment difference is not significant (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0.5445). All other participants explicitly stated that they would like to use
their strategies again. This indicates to us that the reliability of our data is high.
In the remainder of this section we subsequently describe the contributions on the induced
paths {cit}t≥0 in Subsection 3.1, the results on initial contributions c
i
0
in Subsection 3.2 and the
dynamic responses ϕi(c¯) in Subsection 3.3. In Subsection 3.4 we will account for heterogeneity
among our participants and in Subsection 3.5 we will provide some more evidence from
the post-experimental questionnaire. All individual decisions are displayed in the graphs
in Appendices A and B.
3.1 Simulations of induced paths
One advantage of our design is, as mentioned before, that all our observations are independent.
Hence we can use them to simulate the induced path under all possible matching constellations
and thus largely control for path dependence. It has been shown that heterogeneity among
the participants can create a fair amount of path dependence which is hard to control for
using conventional designs (see e.g., Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1996).
To exploit this advantage in our design we simulated the induced path of contributions over
20 periods for each of the possible 10,626 groups as if the members of this group are interacting
as partners. Figure 1 displays for both treatments for each period the five interesting quantiles
over the group contributions. Despite the absence of an endgame effect (due to the use of the
random ending rule and our strategy method), these paths look qualitatively much like what
has been found in previous literature.6
The median contribution in the Partner treatment starts at 6.75, drops to 6.50 in one
period and remains constant in the remaining periods. For the Stranger treatment the me-
dian contribution starts at 5.75, drops to 1.75 within five interactions and remains at this
level in later periods. The difference in the average contributions between the Partner and
Stranger treatment is slightly smaller with contribution levels at 6.15 and 2.75 respectively,
but nevertheless still substantial.
There are two additional properties worth noting. First, the .75 quantile in the Stranger
treatment and the .25 quantile in the Partner treatment remain close to a contribution of
4.25 after the fifth period. This indicates that where 75% of the induced paths (group com-
binations) have contributions not below this level in the Partner treatment, an equal share
of the induced paths (group combinations) have contributions not above this level in the
Stranger treatment. Second, the .025 and .975 quantiles show that for the Partner treatment
5Out of those 29% (37%) many participants expressed ‘minor’ regret with statements such as “Yes I would
allocate a little more on screen one. I allocated 7, now I would allocate 9”, “Only some small differences”, and
just “Maybe”.
6See the references mentioned in the introduction.
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Figure 1: Quantiles for the Partner (black) and Stranger (grey) treatment. The solid line depicts the
median; the dashed lines the .75 and .25 quantiles; the dotted lines the .025 and 0.975 quantiles.
contributions go down to zero in less than 2.5% of the cases and go up to full contribution in
less than 2.5% of the cases in the Stranger treatment.
Overall we can conclude that contributions on the induced path are much higher in the
Partner than in the Stranger treatment and that this is so irrespective of the particular match-
ing realized in the experiment.
Observation 1. Contributions tend to be larger in a Partner treatment than in the Stranger
treatment.
3.2 Initial contribution
The average initial contribution in the Partner treatment was 6.92 tokens and 5.71 in the
Stranger treatment. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of initial contributions for the
two treatments. The distribution of the Partner treatment first-order stochastically dominates
that of the Stranger treatment.
Although Figure 2 indicates a clear difference between initial contributions in the Partner
and Stranger treatment, a Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.2384, two-sided) does not provide evi-
dence for this difference to be statistically significant at conventional significance levels. This
insignificance might be caused by the high variance in the observations.
Observation 2. Initial contributions are larger in the Partner treatment than in the Stranger
treatment.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of initial contributions for the Partner (black) and Stranger (grey)
treatment.
3.3 Dynamic response behavior
In order to analyze the dynamic responses, we ran the following simple OLS regression with
random effects:7
ϕi(c¯) = α+ β ∗ c¯+ δS + δS ∗ c¯+ ε
i,
where δS is a treatment dummy taking the value 1 in the Stranger treatment and 0 in the
Partner treatment. The coefficient on the interaction term δS ∗ c¯ turned out not to be signif-
icant and hence could be dropped from the final regression. This indicates that participants
did not react significantly more strongly to others’ contributions in the previous round in the
Partner treatment than in the Stranger treatment (nor vice versa). The last term εi captures
the noise.
dependent variable: contribution (cit)
coefficient p-value 95% confidence interval
const. 2.2301 0.000 1.3151 3.1451
c¯t−1 0.6085 0.000 0.5545 0.6626
δS −1.7689 0.005 −3.0053 −0.5326
Table 1: OLS regressions on response behavior.
The regression results in Table 1 show that contributions are strictly increasing in the
average contributions of the previous period and that participants contributed significantly
more in the Partner than in the Stranger treatment. Figure 8 in Appendix C shows that
irrespective of the initial contributions, the induced path converges to everyone contributing
roughly 5.7 in the Partner treatment and 1.7 in the Stranger treatment if everyone were
behaving according to the regression outcome above.
7Figure 7 in Appendix C indicates that linearity is a plausible assumption. Nevertheless, we also ran
a quadratic model, which did not result a substantially better fit, neither were the quadratic coefficients
significant.
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Next we will have a look at the dynamic responses on the individual level. Inspired by
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (forthcoming) we relate the mean
dynamic response contribution to the slope of the dynamic response for each participant
separately. The mean is given by µi = 1
11
∑
10
c¯=0
ϕi(c¯) and the slope by βi as estimated in the
following regression separately for each participant: ϕi(c¯) = αi + βi ∗ c¯+ εi.
A Mann-Whitney test indicates that while the distribution of mean responses µi is signif-
icantly different across the two treatments (p = 0.0549), the estimated slopes βi do not differ
significantly between the two treatments (p = 0.4073). These two findings are consistent with
the earlier findings from the regression.
The cumulative distribution of the mean dynamic responses µi is shown in Figure 3. The
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of mean response contributions for the Partner (black) and Stranger
(grey) treatment.
mean contribution in the Partner treatment first-order stochastically dominates that of the
Stranger treatment. In addition, Table 2 shows that in the Partner treatment there is a higher
(smaller) intensity to contribute above (below) the previous average contribution than in the
Stranger treatment.
previous average by others
response 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sum
> 14 11 12 13 14 11 13 12 11 10 0 121
= 10 6 5 3 3 5 3 3 4 5 16 63
< 0 7 7 8 7 8 8 9 9 9 8 80
> 9 10 7 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 0 66
= 15 3 6 6 7 5 5 5 7 4 8 71
< 0 11 11 13 11 13 13 13 12 14 16 127
Table 2: Intensity to contribute above/equal/below the previous group average for the Partner (first
block) and Stranger (second block) treatment.
Finally, Figure 4 depicts the resulting (µi, βi)–pairs for each individual. The left panel
displays the Partner treatment; the right panel the Stranger treatment. We see that where
for the Stranger treatment there is a strong correlation between the mean and the slope
9
(Spearman test, ρ = 0.5462, p = 0.0058), there is not such a clear correlation in the Partner
treatment (Spearman test, ρ = −0.0856, p = 0.6909). In other words, those participants that
contribute more in the Stranger treatment tend to also react more strongly to their oppo-
nents’ contributions, while in the Partner treatment there is no such relation.
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Figure 4: Mean vs. slope of dynamic response behavior for the Partner (left) and Stranger (right)
treatment.
Observation 3. Mean response contributions are significantly higher in the Partner than
in the Stranger treatment. There is no significant treatment difference in the slopes of the
dynamic responses.
3.4 Categorization
We categorize our participants into six categories, according to whether they provide a ‘high’
(> 5) or ‘low’ (< 5) initial contribution and whether their dynamic response is upward sloping,
flat at zero or of any other shape. We classify a dynamic response as ‘upward sloping’ whenever
the 95% confidence interval for βi is strictly above zero and the p-value for βi below 1% level.8
A ‘free rider’ never contributes more than 2 units. Table 3 and 4 provide an overview of the
sizes of the categories in our two treatments.
initial dynamic response
contribution upward sloping free rider other total
high 50.0% − 12.5% 62.5%
low 16.7% − 20.8% 37.5%
total 66.7% − 33.3% 100.0%
Table 3: Categorization of participants in the Partner treatment.
Most participants rely on increasing strategies in our experiment (two-thirds of all par-
ticipants, irrespective of the treatment). These strategies are reminiscent of what is often
8Individual regression tables can be provided upon demand.
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initial dynamic response
contribution upward sloping free rider other total
high 41.7% 4.2% 8.3% 54.2%
low 25.0% 20.8% − 45.8%
total 66.7% 25.0% 8.3% 100.0%
Table 4: Categorization of participants in the Stranger treatment.
called ‘conditional cooperation’ in the literature.9 The categorization found in the Stranger
treatment is perfectly consistent with the results obtained by Keser and van Winden (2000),
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (forthcoming). Treatment differences
emerge in the number of free-riders, which is 25% in the Stranger treatment and zero in the
Partner treatment (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.0001) and in the number of participants that use a
high initial contribution (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.2348).
Observation 4. Irrespective of the treatment, most participants (two-thirds) use upward
sloping strategies. In the Partner treatment there are significantly less free riders than in the
Stranger treatment.
3.5 Questionnaire Data
In this subsection we report some selective evidence from our post-experimental questionnaire
on gender differences and treatment differences in ‘norm perception’.10
Gender 24 men and 24 women participated in our experiment. There were 14 women in the
Stranger treatment and 10 women in the Partner treatment. A binomial test cannot reject the
hypothesis that our sample is gender balanced for either of our treatments (p = 0.4167). We
find that men make significantly higher initial contributions than women (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0.0011), but mean conditional contributions are not significantly different across gen-
ders (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.2877), neither is the slope of contributions (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0.0816). Initial contributions of men are on average 8.4/7.6 with a standard deviation
of 2.3/3.2 for the Partner/Stranger treatment, while women contribute on average 5.0/4.4
initially with a standard deviation of 3.2/3.9.
Norm perception An interesting treatment difference arises when we look at norm per-
ceptions. We confronted the participants with eight statements out of which we highlight the
9See Keser and van Winden (2000), Fischbacher et al. (2001), Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (forthcoming) or
Grimm and Mengel (2009).
10The full questionnaire is available upon request.
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following four:11
S3: Allocating a lot to [the public good] makes me feel good!
S4: Allocating less than my (former) group members to [the public good] makes me feel bad!
S5: Allocating a lot to [the public good] is a sign of intelligence.
S6: Allocating little to [the public good] is a sign of intelligence.
Participants had to evaluate these statements on a scale of 1 (totally agree) to 7 (totally dis-
agree). Table 5 shows the mean level of agreement to each statement in the two treatments
with the standard deviation in parentheses.
S3 S4 S5 S6
Partner 3.33 (0.36) 4.00 (0.35) 2.70 (0.30) 5.33 (0.20)
Stranger 3.58 (0.38) 4.38 (0.41) 3.38 (0.40) 4.20 (0.34)
Table 5: Levels of agreement (scale 1–7) to the statements.
The first thing to notice are the treatment differences in the reactions to statements S6 and
S5. In the Partner treatment participants agree much more to the statement that allocating a
lot to the public good is a sign of intelligence (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.0623), whereas they agree
much less to the statement that contributing little is a sign of intelligence (Mann-Whitney,
p < 0.0001). Furthermore, while the level of agreement to the more emotional statements
S3 and S4 does not differ much from that of S5 and S6 in the Stranger treatment, in the
Partner treatment participants show significantly higher levels of agreement to statement S5
than to any other statement (including the four statements not further discussed here) and
lower levels of agreement to statement S6 than to any other statement.
4 Discussion
It is a by now common finding in experiments on repeated public good games that subjects’
behavior differs from the game theoretic predictions of subgame perfection and also often
Nash equilibrium. This raises the question whether subjects recognize the strategic implica-
tions of a repeated game situation compared to a one-shot (or random matching) situation.
Experimentalists have tried to induce this difference in the lab via ‘Partner’ and ‘Stranger’
designs and have found mixed results.
In this experimental study, we have explored the difference between these two matching
protocols in an environment that excludes learning and explicit reputation building. We
found that even in such an environment there are significant differences, suggesting that
neither explicit reputation building, nor emotions, nor learning are the sole determinants of
the difference between partner and stranger matchings.12
11In the experiment we called the public good ‘project Y’.
12Of course any of these could exacerbate the effects we have already found in this ‘cold’ setting in a more
12
The fact that two-thirds of all subjects use conditional (upward sloping) strategies together
with the fact that there are significantly more free-riders in the stranger treatment suggests
that subjects are well aware of the strategic implications of the partner/stranger design. In
other words, they seem to be able to distinguish well between one-shot and repeated situations.
The observed patterns are partly consistent with a theory of reciprocity, since in the
stranger treatment there are less ways to effectively implement reciprocity. There are two
elements, though, which suggests that such a theory requires at least some agents to be
strategic. Reciprocity can explain the data only if (a) some ‘free-riders’ are strategic enough
to anticipate reciprocity in the partner treatment and hence refrain from contributing nothing
and (b) some agents provide higher initial contributions strategically anticipating reciprocity.
Also the fact that the slope of the dynamic responses is not higher in the partner than in
the stranger treatment suggests that reciprocity is not the driving force behind our treatment
differences.
The evidence found in the questionnaire seems to confirm our overall impression that
participants realized the strategic implications of the implemented matching protocol. In
the partner treatment they state significantly higher levels of agreement to ‘rational motives’
rather than ‘emotional motives’ and they agree much more to the statement that contributing
is an ‘intelligent’ thing to do.
In sum, we found significant differences in contributions between a partner and stranger
design which can be explained only if a significant amount of agents are strategic. Our
participants seem to recognize the strategic implications of repeated interaction versus a
random matching scenario and they do treat these situations as fundamentally different.
This obviously need not imply that they play Nash equilibrium, since they might differ in
their levels of rationality as well as priors about others. Finally, in less ‘cold’ designs other
effects (like emotions, reputation building, etc.) may come into play, which could make the
observed treatment differences even stronger. Our design enables us, though, to conclude
that strategic considerations are an important determinant for behavior in repeated public
good games.
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Figure 5: Individual decisions by the 24 participants in the Partner treatment.
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Figure 6: Individual decisions by the 24 participants in the Stranger treatment.
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C Partner vs. stranger
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Figure 7: Average decisions by the 24 participants in the Partner (black) and Stranger (grey) treat-
ment. The dashed lines illustrate the regression outcome.
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Figure 8: Convergence of contributions over time if everyone were having the regression estimate as
dynamic response in the Partner (black) and Stranger (grey) treatment.
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D Instructions
This appendix provides the written instructions as we used them in the Partner treatment.
Apart from adding ‘former’ when referring to the group members in the previous period, the
text for the Stranger treatment was similar.
Welcome
Dear participant,
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. It will last about 45–60 minutes.
These instructions are solely for your private information. It is important that you read them
carefully. All other participants in this experiment receive identical instructions.
In order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we want to ask you
to follow the general rules during the whole experiment:
• Do not communicate with other participants!
• Do not forget to switch off your mobile phone!
• Read the instructions carefully. If something is not well explained or you have any
question now or at any time during the experiment, then ask one of the experimenters.
Do, however, not ask out loud, raise your hand instead. We will clarify questions
privately.
• You may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• After the experiment, remain seated till we have paid you.
• If you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore, we will
have to exclude you from this (and future) experiment(s) and you will not receive any
compensation.
In addition to the 3 Euro participation fee you are compensated according to your perfor-
mance. We will not speak of Euros during the experiment, but rather of ECU (Experimental
Currency Units). At the end of the experiment, the total amount you have earned will be
converted to Euro at the following rate:
1 ECU = 3 Eurocents.
The payment takes place in cash at the end of the experiment. Your decisions and earnings
in this experiment will remain anonymous.
−→
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Situation
Below we will explain the different decisions you can take in this experiment. First, though,
we introduce you to the basic decision situation. You will find control questions that help
you to understand the environment at the end of this paragraph.
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member is endowed
with 10 tokens and has to decide how to allocate these tokens between project X and project
Y . Each token allocated to project X provides you with an income of 2 ECU. Each token
allocated to project Y generates an income of 4 ECU which is equally shared among the four
group members, i.e. gives an income of 1 ECU to each group member (including you). The
same rule is applied to all other group members. Hence, you will also get 1 ECU for every
token they allocate to project Y . Your income can be summarized by the following formula:
Your income =
2 × tokens that you allocate to project X
+ 1 × all tokens that are allocated to project Y by all the group members
−→
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Control Questions 1
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain understanding of
the calculation of your income, which varies with your decision about how to allocate the 10
tokens. Please answer all the questions and write down your calculations.
1. Assume none of the four group members (including you) allocates anything to project
Y .
(a) What will your income be?
(b) What will be the income of each of the other group members?
2. Assume all of the four group members (including you) allocate all of their 10 tokens to
project Y .
(a) What will your income be?
(b) What will be the income of each of the other group members?
3. Suppose that the other 3 group members allocate on average 5 tokens each to project
Y .
(a) What will your income be, if you—in addition to the 15 tokens—allocate 1 token
to project Y ?
(b) What will your income be, if you—in addition to the 15 tokens—allocate 4 tokens
to project Y ?
(c) What will your income be, if you—in addition to the 15 tokens—allocate 7 tokens
to project Y ?
4. Suppose you allocate 4 tokens to project Y .
(a) What will your income be, if the other 3 group members—in addition to your 4
tokens—allocate on average 22
3
tokens each to project Y ?
(b) What will your income be, if the other 3 group members—in addition to your 4
tokens—allocate on average 51
3
tokens each to project Y ?
(c) What will your income be, if the other 3 group members—in addition to your 4
tokens—allocate on average 8 tokens each to project Y ?
−→
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Duration
The situation above will be repeated for an unknown number of periods. Every period there
is a chance of 90% that the experiment continues with one more period. Hence, every period
there is a chance of 10% that the experiment ends.13 This means that no matter in which
period you are, in expectation, another 9 periods will follow. Your final income is the total of
your incomes over all periods.
Matching
Before the first period, a central computer divides the participants randomly into groups
of 4. Groups remain fixed throughout the entire session. The assignment process is ran-
dom and anonymous, so you will not know who else is in your group. Apart from us—the
experimenters—nobody else will ever learn the group compositions.
Feedback
After every period you are informed about the average number of tokens allocated to project
Y by your group members. Your period income follows directly from this information together
with your own allocation decision.
−→
13A central computer draws for each period a random number between 0 and 1 and the experiment will
continue as long as the number drawn is less than 0.9. For every period the random draw is independent of
previous draws.
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Your decision
In the experiment you are asked to make two decisions. The first decision is on the initial
allocation of the 10 tokens between project X and Y in the first period. This decision
(together with that of your group members) determines your income in the first period. For
all subsequent periods you can (but need not) condition your allocation decision on the average
allocation of tokens to project Y by your group members in the previous period. This is why,
in this experiment, you are asked to fill in two decision screens.
In the first decision screen you are asked to indicate your initial allocation (in integer amounts)
of the 10 tokens between projects X and Y (see Screenshot 1).
Decision Screen 1
Amount of tokens 10 tokens
Tokens that you allocate to project X
Tokens that you allocate to project Y
OK
Screenshot 1
−→
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In the second decision screen you are asked about your allocation in a period conditional on
the average allocation of tokens to project Y by your group members in the previous period
(see Screenshot 2). This decision is a little more complicated than the first decision, since
you will not know the average allocation of your group members at the time of filling in this
decision screen. This is why you have to indicate your allocation of the 10 tokens conditional
on all of their possible average allocations to project Y rounded to the nearest integer.
The screen should be read as follows. In the first two cells you enter your allocation of the 10
tokens (in integer amounts) between project X and project Y when in the previous period the
average allocation to project Y by your group members was larger or equal to 0 but strictly
less than 0.5. In the next two cells you enter your allocation of the 10 tokens when in the
previous period the average allocation to project Y by your group members was larger or
equal to 0.5 but strictly less than 1.5, and so on ....
Decision Screen 2
0 project X
project Y
1 project X
project Y
2 project X
project Y
3 project X
project Y
4 project X
project Y
5 project X
project Y
6 project X
project Y
7 project X
project Y
8 project X
project Y
9 project X
project Y
10 project X
project Y
OK
Screenshot 2
Keep in mind that all participants take the same two decisions. Neither you nor your group
members will be able to change any of the two decisions during the experiment. Hence, your
decisions in the second decision screen will be used to compute your allocation in all periods
(except the first) of the experiment. This also applies to your group members.
−→
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Result
Next, the experiment will be simulated on basis of these two decisions taken by all group
members. That is, for each group member the decision in the first decision screen applies for
the first period. Every following period the decision of each group member is determined by
the choices that are made in the second decision screen.
For clarification:
1. Your allocation for the first period is simply your initial allocation that you have chosen
in the first decision screen. The same holds for all your group members.
2. To determine your allocation in the second period, the average of your group members’
initial allocations to project Y is computed. Your allocation is then determined by the
corresponding entry you made in the second decision screen. The same is done for all
your group members.
3. To determine your allocation in the third period, the average of your group members’
allocations to project Y in the second period (see step 2) is computed. Your allocation
is then determined by the corresponding entry you made in the second decision screen.
The same is done for all your group members.
4. To determine your allocation in the fourth period, the average of your group members’
allocations to project Y in the third period (see step 3) is computed. Your allocation
is then, again, determined by the corresponding entry you made in the second decision
screen. The same is done for all your group members.
5. ... [this procedure continues until the final (but unknown) period.]
This means that:
• Your (initial) allocation can affect future allocations by your group members in all
periods of the experiment.
• Vice versa, (initial) allocations by your other group members can affect your future
allocations in all periods of the experiment.
Hence, you should take both of your decisions very carefully.
−→
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Feedback
For each period you receive feedback on all income relevant information (see Screenshot 3).
That is, for each period, you receive feedback on your allocation to project Y and the average
allocation to project Y by your group members. Both numbers determine your period income.
The second number (together with your choices in the second decision screen) influences your
next period allocation. Whether a next period follows is based on the random draw by a
central computer.
Feedback
Period:
Your allocation to project Y :
Average allocation to project Y by your group members:
Total group allocation to project Y :
Your income from project X:
Your income from project Y :
Your total income in this period:
Random number [0,1]:
Another period? (0=No, 1=Yes):
2
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
0.7612
1
OK
Period
1
2
Your allocation to Y
xx
xx
Average allocation to Y by group members
xx
xx
Group allocation to Y
xx
xx
Period income
xx
xx
Total income
xx
xx
Screenshot 3
−→
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Control Questions 2
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain understanding of
how decisions affect final allocations over periods. Please write down your answers to these
questions. Notice that all numbers used are chosen arbitrary.
1. Suppose that all group members (including you) have chosen an initial allocation of 2
tokens to project Y and the following conditional allocations to project Y :
0 −→ 1 4 −→ 7 8 −→ 7
1 −→ 4 5 −→ 2 9 −→ 10
2 −→ 3 6 −→ 8 10 −→ 9
3 −→ 1 7 −→ 9
(a) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the second period?
(b) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the third period?
(c) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the fourth period?
(d) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the fifth period?
2. Suppose that all group members (including you) have chosen an initial allocation of 8
tokens to project Y and the following conditional allocations to project Y :
0 −→ 1 4 −→ 7 8 −→ 6
1 −→ 0 5 −→ 5 9 −→ 9
2 −→ 0 6 −→ 2 10 −→ 8
3 −→ 2 7 −→ 9
(a) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the second period?
(b) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the third period?
(c) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the fourth period?
(d) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the fifth period?
−→
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3. Suppose that all group members (including you) have chosen an initial allocation of 6
tokens to project Y and the following conditional allocations to project Y :
0 −→ 5 4 −→ 7 8 −→ 4
1 −→ 6 5 −→ 5 9 −→ 5
2 −→ 7 6 −→ 4 10 −→ 3
3 −→ 4 7 −→ 5
(a) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the second period?
(b) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the third period?
(c) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the fourth period?
(d) What will be each group member’s allocation to project Y in the fifth period?
4. Indicate for each of the statements whether they are true or false.
Statement True False
Each period my group members are the same as in the previous
period! 2 2
The chance that the experiment ends is larger in later periods! 2 2
All relevant decisions are made before feedback is received! 2 2
The initial allocation potentially affects all periods; even if the
game has very many! 2 2
My initial allocation is not relevant for the allocations of my
group members in the second period! 2 2
I know my group members’ initial allocations before I fill in the
second decision screen! 2 2
My conditional allocations are not relevant for the allocations of
my group members in the third period! 2 2
My group members, in principle, have the same influence on my
income as I have on theirs! 2 2
end of instructions
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